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Since our exit from Bonn (June 2011), the climate regime has taken significant steps 
toward developing short-range standards for global emission reductions based on a 
temperature threshold of 2° C above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC 2010c). However, 
as the climate regime pursues a post-Kyoto agenda to establish specific greenhouse gas 
(GHG) targets, the question that now stands is how these short-term standards, fixed to 
a temperature threshold, fit into more holistic climate policy objectives. This article 
seeks to situate these short-term objectives within longer-term climate policy goals by 
examining five different approaches to developing climate architecture and policy. The 
conclusion is that the current approach based on national targets and timetables is 
insufficient to generate long-term equitable and efficacious climate policy.  
 
Since the Bali Road Map1 was constructed, focus has been on what the IPCC (2007) 
established as a dangerous threshold temperature of +2° C (IPCC 2007b; UNFCCC 
2009; UNFCCC 2010b; UNFCCC 2010c). From Copenhagen in 2009 through Bonn 
2011, the mitigation discourse has centered this threshold as the target for cultivating 
specific emission reductions.2 While the threshold has been agreed upon generally3 and 
                                                 
1 A two-year plan to generate a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 based on fixed national 
emissions targets. 
2 In addition, significant progress has also been made in concatenating the diversity of country reduction 
commitments and in developing more transparency in the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
processes. 
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some headway made, three critical issues have emerged that threaten the future of 
effective climate governance. First, mitigation in a post-Kyoto scheme is based on a 
‘pledge and review’ system, where individual countries promise to cut emissions and 
agree to a monitoring of their progress. This pledge relies exclusively on the good 
intentions of individual countries to meet global emission goals, one that can be easily 
subverted or deprioritized, and subjected to traditional collective action dilemmas.  
 
Second, there is no consensus and ambition to develop a ‘shared vision’ for longer-term 
commitments. The AWG-LCA (Ad hoc Working Group on Long-range Cooperative 
Action under the UNFCCC) explicitly directs, ‘Parties share a vision for long-term 
cooperative action in order to achieve the objective of the Convention under its Article 
2’ (UNFCCC 2010b). Little has been accomplished since Kyoto in formulating this 
vision. In fact, long-term cuts in emissions and concentrations were excluded from 
consideration as part of the shared vision, and put on the agenda for COP 18 in Durban, 
South Africa in 2011 (WRI 2010). There also remains little in common between the 
developed and developing countries in mitigating emissions. Finally, there are no 
common targets to fulfill long-range objectives as outlined in Article 2 of the UNFCCC.  
 
Third, there are significant issues in the implementation of emission controls to meet the 
2° C temperature target. As it stands, current pledges are inadequate to reach this target. 
Specifically, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) concluded in 
Cancun (2010) that existing pledges only amounted to 60 percent of the greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reduction necessary to meet the 2° C target (UNEP 2010; see also, 
Levin and Bradley 2010). This leaves a critical gap in meeting the target itself. So, 
while the ‘pledge system’ may stimulate interest initially from China and the USA 
(whose emissions represent more than 40 percent of the global total), it also means that 
these two countries can hold the rest of the regime attendant to its national self-interests. 
Specifically, the universal nature of the current approach allows for certain countries to 
continue holding the regime hostage to its interests (Prins & Rayner 2007). 
 
Overall, while the focus has been on minimizing emissions to avoid this threshold 
temperature, scant attention has been paid to longer-term goals and approaches to reach 
                                                 
3 Some within the regime, particularly those already vulnerable to climate changes like Small Island 
States, have advocated a 1.5° C threshold; however, many in the regime have countered that this is not 
pragmatically feasible.  
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those goals. Despite the optimism surrounding the recent developments in climate 
governance, these issues raise important questions about the viability of the current 
global governance to meet the +2° C target to prevent long-term climate disruption.  
 
The thesis of this article is that existing deficiencies emphasize the need for long-term 
goals within the regime to guide short-term policy objectives. In many ways, the long-
term trajectory is more salient to building and establishing effective climate policy than 
short-term objectives of national emission targets (Rayner 2010). As it stands now, the 
hope is that by meeting short-term goals, long-term consequences will be mitigated. I 
argue that this may lead to ineffective results. Without a clear set of long-term 
objectives to drive climate negotiations, ‘ad hoc approaches and incremental decisions 
may prematurely foreclose options for protecting the climate’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 
2003) now and for future generations. In addition, this approach neglects to address the 
underlying drivers of climate change, that is, the systems, institutions, and discourses in 
which the problem itself is created. If these drivers are not addressed, the 
efficaciousness of climate governance will be limited. This possibly will exacerbate 
present global inequities, and create a subclass of displaced and vulnerable populations. 
In short, the current short-term approach does little to change the global structure in 
which the problem is embedded.  
 
There are larger implications from this approach that are not extensively considered in 
literature or policies. Article 2 lays out the purpose of the climate regime, stating that 
the ‘objective’ is to avoid ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’ (italics mine). Article 2 hinges on how ‘dangerous’ is defined and what exactly 
constitutes the ‘climate system’—that is, is it merely the biophysical changes in the 
atmosphere or does it include impacts that affect people? The current approach to 
climate governance renders the definition of ‘dangerous’ to be a simple function of 
limiting global GHG emissions to avoid exceeding the 2° C threshold. This short-term 
prescriptive approach sees the issue as purely an environmental problem that can be 
managed through technical solutions to limit national GHGs based on discretionary 
country pledges. This unnecessarily mischaracterizes the problems posed by climate 
change. In addition, despite recent progress in bringing climate adaptation into the 
discussions through the Cancun Adaptation Framework and securing pledges for 
funding ($100B) over the next ten years (UNFCCC 2010c), there has been little 
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practical global governance and implementation on large-scale adaptation. By treating 
climate problems exclusively as an environmental issue, the current adaptation structure 
treats the symptoms rather than the cause, ignoring other significant implications for 
policy.  
 
Efficient and equitable climate policy cannot be achieved without first a definitional 
dialogue funneled toward developing long-term policy goals that should precede any 
short-range solutions. Hard targets may not be set, but particularly the USA and China 
must establish long-term goals; otherwise, short-term successes can be quickly 
undermined. Establishing long-term goals can offer multifarious approaches to meet 
those goals, rather than a direct, linear based on a ‘one size fits all’ approach that has led 
to the present inadequacies in climate governance.4 It also allows shifts in political and 
economic global structure to accommodate more equitable and effective institutional 
arrangements to meet the long-term goals.  
 
While the objective of the regime should remain climate stabilization to avoid 
dangerous interference, it should not be done based on GHG targets. In this light, 
establishing long-term goals for climate policy is imperative and it must: (i) include 
differing paths for the differing circumstances of states, (ii) address the fundamental 
drivers of climate change, and (iii) address the ‘effects’ side of the equation based on 
the three pillars of sustainable development, i.e. social & economic development, 
environment and climate protection and equity. Based on these critical elements, what 
follows will analyze various approaches to addressing the climate change problem to 
determine what may help establish long-term goals for the regime. Based on this, I 
argue for discarding national emission targets in favor of long-term goals based on 
renewable energy and enhanced security for those most vulnerable to climate impacts. 
 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
The history of Article 2 
The core of the UNFCCC centers on Article 2, which outlines the objective of the 
agreement, and Article 3, which provides guiding principles to implement the 
Convention. These two Articles set up the remainder of the agreement, including the 
                                                 
4 Domestically it requires constituents to buy into short-term political sacrifice for longer-term goals—
goals that they may or may not recognize as in their interest. This is particularly true for the USA. For key 
states like the USA, if domestic constituencies cannot support global policy on climate change, there is a 
serious risk of undermining the entire regime.  
Fisher         Shifting Global Climate Governance 
 
PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011.  5 
commitments required by signatories, and a practical agenda on observations, education 
and training, future Conferences of the Parties (COPs), scientific bodies, and a financial 
mechanism. Since the early 1970s, the climate policy debate focused on how to stabilize 
GHG concentrations, and this aspect was enshrined in Article 2 as the core objective of 
the Convention. Article 2 (UN 1992) states, in full: 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system [emphasis 
added]. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to 
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
 
Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, however, attention in policy circles gradually 
shifted to the near term, particularly to the development, ratification, and 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Specifically, most developed countries have 
focused on mitigation targets in the Kyoto Protocol while developing countries have 
focused more on burden sharing than on Article 2 (See UNFCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14 
2002; Blanchard et al. 2002; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005).5 Recently, this focus 
continued in Copenhagen and Cancun with an attempt to generate post-Kyoto 
agreement for reducing GHG emissions through binding national targets. To date, a 
post-Kyoto agreement has not been reached, and binding national targets have been 
reduced to a ‘pledge and review’ system. These developments have led increasingly to a 
narrowing of focus by the regime to ensure: a) the viability of the regime itself; b) 
tangible short-term imperatives are agreed to; and c) attempt to build consensus on these 
objectives. However, this narrowing of concentration has also led to discounting long-
term goals. 
 
Questions arising from Article 2 
Article 2 is indeterminate, as it ‘conveys some degree of the substance of the long-term 
goal while carefully avoiding any quantitative expression of it’ (Gupta & van Asselt 
2006: 83; Bodansky 1993). As a result, it raises critical definitional questions that 
inhibit determining long-term goals for addressing global climate change. Article 2 
centers on the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations … at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ [emphasis 
                                                 
5 In addition, the G77, including China, has objected to discussions of Article 2 for fear that it might lead 
to emissions caps for them (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003). 
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added]. Three critical points can be made about this first half of Article 2. First, and 
most importantly, it is not at all clear what ‘dangerous’ means. Is there a specific level 
of danger associated with climate change that represents a trigger point for the 
biophysical climate system? Second, GHG concentrations become the de facto 
measuring stick for anthropogenic interference, and not for example, mean global 
temperature.6 Third, who is in danger?—that is, is it a measure of targets and timetables, 
or danger to regions, or specific locales and peoples?  
 
How these fundamental questions are approached, and ultimately answered, brings a 
host of critical, secondary issues to the fore. These point to the role of ‘climate impacts’ 
in the climate governance equation, prompting three questions.  First, where along the 
causal path is ‘danger’ or risk to be measured? Second, how do we regulate and manage 
‘anthropic interference with the climate system’? Third, how is ‘climate system’ defined 
(that is, what constitutes the ‘climate system’ that is in danger)? These questions prompt 
a second set of questions. How is ‘danger’ or risk to be measured; in other words, at 
what point in the climate cycle do we measure what is dangerous to the climate system? 
How do we govern the danger or risk? That is, do we address GCC by adjustments in 
emissions reductions through mitigation and trading, the process itself (by empower 
decision making), the structures that create the material and ideational underpinnings of 
GHG emissions (e.g. an energy revolution), or the impacts? Is it a combination? To date, 
there has been but one approach—mitigation through national targets (or now ‘pledge 
and review’) with an increasing discourse around adaptation. Finally, what is included 
in the climate system? Is it simply a measure of environmental or more specifically 
atmospheric danger, or regional or local climate systems that then impact people? Does 
the definition include how people are affected by changes in the climate system? Who is 
prioritized, if at all, within the ‘climate system’? These questions are imperative for 
developing future climate policy.  
 
Where we are today on Article 2 
Since the inception of the UNFCCC, most of the activity on Article 2 has focused on the 
scientific and economic aspects of GHG concentration stabilization. Early on, the IPCC 
                                                 
6 There is criticism about the use of GHG concentrations as the measuring stick for slow climate change, 
primarily because there is no fixed quantifiable measure for anticipating future or anticipated GHG 
emissions. See, for example Victor (2001). In addition, as the language has shifted to the 2 C threshold, 
it seems to run counter to the Article 2 standard. 
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interpreted Article 2 by seeing GHG ‘concentrations stabilization’ as a function of 
national emissions that aggregate in generating future temperature and sea level changes 
(Wigley 1995; Wigley et al. 1996; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005; Schellnhuber et al. 
2006). Therefore, from this early stage, much of the discussion focused on emission 
stabilization pathways on the mitigation side of the climate equation, and has ‘largely 
bypassed the explicit consideration of climate change impacts’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 
2003).  Moreover, these ‘stabilization pathways’ were primarily considered from the 
perspective of aggregate national emissions. In fact, since 1997, international climate 
negotiations were dominated by short-term issues such as the design of rules of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003).  Even today (through Cancun and 
Bonn 2011), the discourse continues to center around emission targets and timetables. 
 
Similarly, the focus on what constitutes ‘danger’ has focused primarily on scientific and 
economic considerations, while social, cultural and ethical dimensions have received 
scant attention (Rayner & Malone 1998; Adger 2001; Elzen & Berk 2003; Gupta 2003; 
Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005; Gupta & van Asselt 2006; Fisher 2011). In addition, the 
psychological aspects of ‘danger’ remain dormant within a climate change context 
(Kasperson et al. 1988; McDaniels et al. 1996; Henry 2000).  That is, to the degree 
impacts were discussed, much of it focused on those direct biophysical impacts with 
global consequences, such as ice sheets (that would contribute to sea level rise), global 
coral bleaching, and the economic costs of these types of impacts and of mitigation. In 
2001, the third assessment report by the IPCC restructured their thinking on Article 2 by 
referring to ‘five areas of concern,’ including: (i) risk of large scale singularities; (ii) 
aggregate impacts; (iii) distribution of impacts; (iv) risks of extreme weather events; and 
(v) risks to unique and threatened systems. Nevertheless, the ‘climate change policy 
debate in the last few years has focused more on the costs of mitigation than on the 
avoided impacts or potential benefits of mitigation’ (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003: 
277–278). Although recently there has been increasing attention to adaptation, 
particularly in light of economic development, the negotiation calculus for large 
emitters continues to focus on the costs of mitigation, rather than avoided impacts 
and/or the impacts to those most vulnerable. Simply, negotiations are driven by costs 
and economics. This is even more so after the ‘pledge and review’ system adoption, 
since key countries can use their discretion on GHG reductions and to what degree they 
will comply. 
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In this regard, in the most recent IPCC AR4 report (2007), contributors drew upon 
Article 2 directly in a call to determine ‘key vulnerabilities’ (IPCC 2007d: 784). For the 
first time, there was a specific call for scientific assessment of what impacts might be 
associated with different levels of GHG concentrations, and ‘normative evaluation by 
policy-makers of which potential impacts and associated likelihoods are significant 
enough to constitute, individually or in combination, DAI [Dangerous Anthropic 
Interference]’ (IPCC 2007d: 784). As a result, today Article 2 and ‘key vulnerabilities’ 
are one of the seven crosscutting themes for all working groups (Patwardhan et al. 
2003; Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005).  
 
As the IPCC AR4 and the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010c) demonstrate, there is 
increasing dialogue on vulnerability and adaptation. However, the discussions remain at 
the periphery of climate policy, which remains driven by mitigation through national 
emission targets to reduce global GHGs.  The goal of this policy approach is to prevent 
global mean surface temperature from exceeding another 2 C, after which many 
scientists agree certain key tipping points in the climate system may be triggered. 
However, despite this near consensus on beyond 2 C temperature target, there remains 
uncertainty on what amount would prevent triggering dangerous tipping points. Thus 
the policy plan is based on reaching short-term targets and hoping that it is enough to 
achieve this 2 C goal. 
 
Operationalizing UNFCCC Article 2 
The climate process: How it works 
At the global level, dynamics of IPAT, population growth, affluence and technology 
contribute to degradation of the biosphere. These drivers have tentacles reaching into 
the national and local levels influenced by more complex drivers of poverty, 
urbanization, land use, income distribution, values and governance ideology. These 
global drivers contribute to the structure that facilitates activities that generate GHGs. 
These drivers merge and combine with anthropogenic drivers at the local level and 
individual level (see Figure 1). There, anthropogenic drivers of GHG emissions take 
place within national and global contexts. These ‘agency’ drivers include fossil fuel 
burning (transportation, refrigeration, and so on), increasing waste in landfills, land use 
(for example, deforestation, rice paddies), and industrial processes (such as cement 
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production).7 In addition, individual environmental values play an important role in 
supporting and justifying these material practices that lead to GHG emissions. These 
individual anthropogenic drivers lead to an accumulation of GHG emissions that enter 
the biophysical climate cycle, which then ‘force’ or produce local biophysical climate 
impacts such as changes in temperature, precipitation, and sea level rise (SLR). These 
climate changes impact human populations, which can be positive or negative, 
depending on sociopolitical and economic structure as well as geography. For many, 
particularly in vulnerable regions, this impact will be negative and will result in some 
form of human and societal impact (see Figure 1 below).8 
Global 
Anthropogenic 
Structural Drivers
Population Dynamics
Affluence/ Energy Use
Technology (+/-)
Local
Anthropogenic 
Drivers
Fossil fuel burning
Industrial processes
Waste Disposal
Land use
Values
Atmospheric 
Concentrations
“Climate Drivers”
Radiative 
Forcing
(+/-)
Biophysical
Climate 
Response
Carbon Cycle Feedback
Biophysical Climate Cycle
Natural 
Drivers
National 
GHG Emissions 
( CO2; CH4; N2O; 
 HCs)
Local Climate
Changes
( Temp, precip, 
SLR, coastal 
erosion)
Human 
Impact
(damage, 
displacement, 
degradation)
Humans directly causing harm to other humans
Outcome Approach
Structural Approach
Source Approach
T&T Approach
Process Approach
Access, Voice, Standing (legal & political)
 
Figure 1. A linear depiction of the ‘climate process.’ This figure illustrates the full range 
of the climate process and how humans cause direct harm to other humans through the 
medium of earth’s climate system. It also represents the five (5) policy approaches to 
address fuller range of the climate problem. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Structural drivers at the local level are different from IPAT at the global level and include policy, 
institutions, organizations/NGOs, culture/traditions, social factors (such as family), and so on. 
8 I do not necessarily see the ‘climate process’ as a linear cause-effect, as depicted in this figure, but it 
helps to demonstrate where in the process may be most effective in addressing climate change. 
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Approaches to climate governance: Framing the ‘Big Picture’ 
A fundamental question for climate governance is where along the cause-effect chain 
provides the most effective and equitable position to address climate change (see Figure 
1). The UNFCCC and recent climate agreements assert climate change must be 
addressed in part through sustainable development. Sustainable Development, it is 
argued by the UN, is a three-sided equation of equity, environment, and economic 
development—the 3 E’s. I will examine five possible approaches to address climate 
change (as depicted in Figure 1) in light of UNFCCC Article 2 and the three pillars of 
sustainable development.  
 
The targets and timetables approach 
The first approach is best characterized by the Targets and Timetables (T&T) approach 
(see Table 1). Currently, the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol (KP), and the Cancun 
Agreements (CA) all seek to regulate GHG emissions as the primary source of climate 
change at the national level. Based on this approach, the Kyoto Protocol commits 
developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to target limits. The single largest 
advantage of this approach is that it is already in use by the UNFCCC and IPCC 
(Torvanger et al. 2004: 9). A second significant advantage is that it works within the 
current constructs of the state-based international system. So the incentive system runs 
parallel with the state-based system, providing rules and norms that help guide, 
implement, and to some extent, enforce GHG emissions’ mitigation through binding 
global agreements supported by domestic mechanisms. Thus, this approach holds the 
state responsible for determining and implementing its own mitigation mechanisms to 
reach target emissions. A third advantage is that it is empirically calculable. A fourth 
advantage is that it is only one step removed from individual behavior (person, firm, 
plant, or corporation) that generates emissions. This reduces the level of uncertainty and 
enhances the validity of empirical measurements. Finally, as technology changes, new 
technical options are easily implemented to mitigate emissions, creating an attractive 
synergy between national governments and corporations that incentivizes new 
technology.  
 
There are significant drawbacks to this approach, however. First, and most importantly, 
it relies heavily on the current international system, which is subject to severe disparities 
in power and leverage. The structure inherently serves the interests of the dominant  
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Table 1. Differing approaches to the architecture and development of climate policy.  
 
powers. This has led to fractious negotiations that have ended in entrenched, seemingly 
intractable, positions by various states and their collaborative partners. Second, this 
represents only a short-term perspective for addressing climate change, with consequent 
solutions designed to slow the global GHG emissions that may trigger irreparable harm 
(which as discussed is the current medium-run goal of the regime).  
 
 
 Source Targets & 
Timetables 
(T&T) 
Structural Process Outcome 
Description Regulate 
individual 
activities that 
produce GHGs 
Regulate at the 
national source 
of GHGs 
Regulate Global 
Political & 
Economic 
Systems 
How int’l 
decisions are 
made in 
regulating 
commitments 
Regulate based on 
effects of CC 
Examples Individual 
allotments 
National GHG 
emissions 
Address 
dynamics of 
PAT 
(pop, tech, & 
affluence) 
International 
negotiation; 
participation; 
markets 
Impacts of climate 
change on local 
populations (e.g. 
adaptation) 
Level of 
Focus 
Local/Individual/ 
Corps: individual 
emissions 
National National & 
Global 
Global Local/community: 
impacts on 
community 
Advantages * Addressing 
fundamental indiv 
drivers of GCC; 
* attacks ‘values’ 
underpinning 
behavior 
* Provides 
common ground 
* allows for clean 
technology to 
address the core of 
emissions 
* GHG 
emissions are 
source of GCC 
* calculable 
* In use (IPCC) 
* step close to 
emissions 
* bring in 
corps/tech 
* addresses 
structural driver 
of GCC 
* inherently 
builds on equity 
considerations 
* problems in 
both poor & 
affluent 
* considers the 
global feedback 
impact of GCC 
* focus is on 
means of 
producing equity 
* fairer 
participation = 
fairer outcome 
* those most 
effected have 
voice & standing 
(access) 
* Rawls: welfare 
of the worst-off 
nations 
maximized 
 
* Fairer burden-
sharing 
* prevents longer 
term problems 
* ensures most 
vulnerable 
covered 
*helps to redress 
structural 
inequities 
*polluter pays 
 
Dis-
advantages 
* Equity = 
egalitarian? 
* Unrealistic for 
historic GHG 
emitters 
* emasculates 
sovereignty 
* need structural 
equality at same 
time 
* subject to 
power in int’l sys 
* distant from 
‘real’ impacts 
* no 
consideration of 
global impacts 
* becomes a 
function of GDP 
*same int’l 
deadlock issues 
* execution - 
Welfare system? 
 
* negotiation 
about leverage & 
thus subject to 
power 
* state’s interest 
paramount 
 
* Increases costs 
* inhibits climate 
action 
* builds a case for 
compensation/ 
damages 
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A third disadvantage is that it remains far removed from the effects and consequences of 
climate change. In fact, this approach offers no calculus of climate impacts, making it a 
highly inequitable policy approach for those who will suffer from significant climate 
effects. Because GHG emissions cannot be simply turned off, and even in the best 
mitigation scenario will continue through inertia, this approach has significant inequity 
built into it for those vulnerable to climate change impacts. In addition, this approach 
does little to address either the drivers of climate change and the political and economic 
structure in which climate change takes place. Thus, it entails deep structural inequity. 
 
A fourth disadvantage is that it counts emissions based on the source of production and 
not consumption. This creates inequitable results because it provides a secondary 
incentive to locate the highest GHG producing activities in the poorest states. Already 
for economic competitive advantage, the ‘dirtiest’ production plants and firms are 
located in these areas, which overall tend to be the most vulnerable to environmental 
change. In essence, this provides cheap goods to the affluent with little or no 
environmental cost. In fact, people largely assume the environmental cost where the 
plant or industry is located through degradation and increased emissions, which could 
offset positive economic development in developing countries. Therefore, this approach 
creates a double incentive to locate these activities in poor states because powerful 
national governments would want the GHG emissions to be counted against least 
powerful states (with the power to do it).9 Incentives converge for both national 
governments and corporations to locate high GHG emission-producing plants in 
developing countries generating severe inequity. Only by counting the GHGs where the 
good is consumed can climate policy generate equitable and economic benefits in line 
with sustainable development. However, this is not the case with the T&T approach. 
 
The source approach 
A second approach characterized by the source approach focuses on individual or local 
level emissions as the foundational drivers of GHG emissions. That is, people—
individually, in communities or as part of corporations, produce and use fossil fuels that 
augment global GHG levels contributing directly to GCC. This approach would regulate 
those activities at the local level. This approach can take many forms, from emission 
                                                 
9 This is only offset under the targets and timetables approach to the degree that CDM in the KP works to 
share of technology through clean energy programs in these countries. 
Fisher         Shifting Global Climate Governance 
 
PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011.  13 
taxes, fuel standards, promoting clean energy use, or ‘contraction and convergence,’10 in 
which global emissions are reduced by reducing per capita (or individual) GHG 
emissions.11 Both the precautionary principle and principles of equity underscore some  
form of per capita approach to stabilizing and ultimately limiting GHG emissions. 
The advantages of a source approach are that it is inherently based on principles of 
equity and thus has a strong justice component that will appeal to a variety of states for 
many reasons. Specifically, a ‘contraction and convergence’ (C&C) policy is based on 
egalitarian criteria; that is, theoretically every person has the right to pollute to the same 
extent (and implicitly to be equally protected from pollution) (Meyer 2000; den Elzen et 
al. 2006). Even global fuel or energy standards are undergirded by egalitarian principles, 
preserving justice as a primary force in climate policy. Yet, it should be noted that 
historical responsibility, a highly debatable aspect of climate ethics, remains outside the 
scope of C&C (Oberheitmann 2010).12 Second, at this individual/local level, the drivers 
of climate change are addressed at its most fundamental level—the industry or energy 
producer and the individual as the consumer of fossil fuels. This is the only approach 
that directly addresses the values that support environmentally degrading behavior.  
 
Most importantly, clean energy technology can be applied at this level both to reduce 
emissions at the extraction/production site as well as at the consumer level. This 
provides a direct link to generating GHG reductions at the base level and does so as part 
of a long-term goal. In the current T&T approach, this is a tertiary goal—driven by the 
primary goal of reducing emissions at the national level. Here, the primary goal and 
focus of the regime is upon developing core technologies that can be used to produce 
cleaner energy, and use this cleaner energy in homes and buildings thereby enhancing 
efficiency, effectiveness, equity and security. Finally, it does offer some common 
ground for getting recalcitrant (yet differently positioned) countries like the USA and 
China to join in the global effort to combat global climate change, both through an 
incentivized approach based on technology and clean economies, as well as long-term 
                                                 
10 ‘Contraction’ is the reducing of global GHG emissions, and ‘convergence’ is the closing of the gap 
between per capita emissions between the affluent and the developing countries to a level (in the future) 
where ultimately emission outputs are equal for every person. The total budget of carbon is to be equally 
shared through ‘entitlements’ based on a negotiable rate of linear convergence by an agreed upon timeline.  
11 C&C was first formally proposed to the UNFCCC at COP-2 in 1996 by the Global Commons Institute, 
and at Copenhagen (2009) became a controversial subject. As expected, it lacked support among 
developed countries. 
12 The ‘Brazilian Proposal’ allocated national emission limits based on historic responsibility, which is 
based on the polluter pays principle (See, Meira Filho & Gonzalez Miguez 2000).  
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goal of recognizing per capita emissions. For example, China already supports C&C, 
while the USA may be enticed by incentives that reduce their obligations (initially) 
toward contraction with higher investment in clean energy. If this technology and clean 
energy were shared with the developing world, this would further soften the ground for 
agreement. This could actually build common ground, rather than feebly attempting to 
‘find’ common ground, around long-run per capita emissions for states with divergent 
interests. 
 
The primary disadvantage of the source approach is that it may be unrealistic for 
historic GHG emitters, who would have to consent (through international negotiation) to 
it—something that to date is rare in international politics. At this point, without 
technology to guarantee low per capita emissions, historical emitters may resist even 
soft long-term targets for several reasons. First, there may be a greater chance to bridge 
the China-USA gap through this approach than the T&T approach, particularly if 
tethered to clean energy incentives. Second, it emasculates sovereignty and a nation’s 
control over its territory and citizens, which is historically a particularly hard sell for 
countries like the USA and China. In this regard, it is extremely doubtful that any 
progress could be expected on C&C or GHG emissions per capita except as a non-
binding long-term goal without other incentives. Third, enforcement would be a 
challenge, because it requires the state to hold individuals accountable for greenhouse 
contributions—a highly unlikely scenario. Fourth, it is difficult to implement if the 
structural conditions that lead to global economic inequality are not addressed 
concomitantly. Finally, it is also difficult to standardize between countries and is 
dependent then on the incentives to develop technology outside of the formal climate 
architecture. 
 
The structural approach 
A third approach is a structural approach, where the focus of addressing climate change 
is on the structures that create and perpetuate GHG emissions. This approach addresses 
the underlying structural drivers of emissions leading to climate change. It would 
regulate climate change through changes to the political and economic systems at both 
the global and national scale. The primary advantage of this approach is that it attempts 
to get at the structural and institutional impediments to addressing climate change. For 
example, this approach would examine traditional structural dynamics leading to 
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environmental degradation, such as population increases, technology, and affluence. 
This leads to a second advantage in that it seeks to recognize the extent to which each 
state is contributing to the problem regardless of socio-economic starting point (based 
on GDP). Theoretically, this is formed upon equity grounds; however, it would 
ultimately turn on whether historical antecedents for socio-economic conditions and 
population growth were concomitantly taken into consideration. Another significant 
advantage is that it recognizes global climate change as a process that continually 
influences and changes the political and economic structure. So part of this calculus 
considers the feedback of biophysical processes from climate changes upon the macro 
human subsystem. 
 
There are serious drawbacks to the structural approach. First, in many ways it relies 
heavily on GDP for determining responsibility toward climate change. As a result, it 
would not differ much in international negotiations from the current T&T approach and 
thus have the same limitations. Second, if climate change is seen as a problem of 
structural drivers, then attending to those institutional drivers becomes a complex 
problem—one that may be as complex as the climate problem itself. For example, 
addressing trade disparities, conditional loans and investment streams that favor 
developed countries, is a complex and highly politicized debate. Increasing 
consumption in both developed and rapidly developing countries is another example—a 
significant issue that has been left off the discussion table altogether. Yet the climate 
problem is embedded within these structural disparities. Finally, addressing climate 
change through structural adjustments runs the risk of appearing as a welfare system 
designed to funnel financial and technological resources from the developed to the 
underdeveloped in a way that seems separate from the impacts of and responsibility for 
climate change. Most likely, these are fatal flaws that would lead to intractable 
collective action problems. However, the structural approach does demonstrate that 
addressing emission reductions and adaptation without attending to the structural drivers 
merely treats the symptoms of the climate problem. 
 
The process approach 
A fourth approach centers on the process and/or procedure through which international 
decisions are made in regulating commitments. The focus is on the international 
negotiation process, participation in the global environmental decision-making, access 
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to information and data, and the market as a medium for addressing GCC. The biggest 
advantage of this approach is that those who are (or will be) adversely affected by 
climate change have both a voice and presumably some form of standing (that is, 
access) to the international system to redress their vulnerabilities, impacts, and damages 
from climate change. A second distinct advantage is that it can produce procedural 
justice by focusing on the means of generating policy. A third, related advantage is, in 
principle, that there is a correlation between fair participation and de minimus fairer 
outcomes. Finally, Rawls’s maxim (1971) is implicit in this approach in that the welfare 
of the worst-off nations should be maximized, and thus operate as a net benefit to the 
poorest nations.13 Although Rawls did not endorse use of his theory directly as an 
argument for economic redistribution in the international arena, and instead confined it 
to a single society, it represents a specific justice approach to climate change that is not 
only relevant to generating equitable policy but one that cannot be ignored (Rawls, 
1999:106). Henry Shue argues that through this process, the well off should not be 
enriched at the expense of the not so well-off, thereby expanding inequality (Shue 1999). 
Finally, it offers a platform for discussing burden sharing, and how to spread the costs 
of mitigation and adaptation (See, Shue 1999; Meyer & Roser 2006; Page 2008). A 
distinct advantage of this approach is therefore that it highlights inequality in deriving 
decisions as well as in the outcomes of decisions. 
 
The disadvantage of the process approach is that ultimately negotiation (at any level) is 
about leverage, and thus is about power. Power in the international system is inherently 
unequal, giving little leverage for those disenfranchised. Similarly, the international 
system continues to be dominated by sovereignty and state self-interest, which again 
diminishes procedural aspects of standing and access for those disaffected by climate 
changes. Moreover, the powerful can use bargaining tactics to undermine collective 
action. As Henry Shue points out, many countries such as the United States (and now 
China) are employing a strategy of waiting for others to do their ‘fair share’ before they 
will agree do the same, resulting in paralysis (Shue 2011). So, the powerful can 
manipulate the procedural process through which climate outcomes are negotiated, 
                                                 
13 This theory is here applied generally to the international arena in the climate context. The argument 
here is that fundamentally distributive justice (in theory) lacks the capacity of imposing differing 
obligations between the domestic and international arenas, as ‘nationality’ would be an arbitrary 
characteristic similar to innate talent, race or social status. In addition, this process approach would not 
necessitate direct wealth redistribution, but a duty to assist those who are directly affected by human 
induced climate change, and to do so to the extent of full reparations. 
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leading once again to unjust outcomes. This suggests that representation and standing 
do not necessarily guarantee an efficient or equitable outcome for parties, and may be 
ineffectual as a global instrument. In addition, a voice without standing (political or 
legal) has little meaning, and further without a legal structure or venue to protect access, 
the procedural approach may make little difference in outcome. Finally, this approach 
cannot represent a stand-alone approach to climate policy; in fact, it must operate as a 
complement to another approach. 
 
The outcomes approach 
Finally, the fifth approach is one based on outcomes of climate change. That is, climate 
policy is developed by examining the effects of GCC, particularly in local communities 
and specific contexts. The most compelling rationale supporting the outcome approach 
is that, because there are multiple ways to achieve just and efficacious climate policy, it 
offers a more diverse platform for equitable burden sharing (Rayner 2010). Second, 
there are underlying legal and political justifications for this approach, as GHG 
emission inputs (by human beings) are a direct causal force in harming both the 
environment and other human beings.14 This causational link moves the GCC issue into 
a sphere of justice that demands (in some form) the outcome approach (that is, 
adaptation). This argument is strengthened by two other variables—disproportionality 
and predisposed vulnerability. Climate change has locally disproportionate effects on 
those already marginalized and vulnerable (Pielke et al. 2007; Fisher 2011), and this 
approach acknowledges and addresses this important aspect of the climate problem. 
Third, this approach emphasizes dealing with the consequences of climate change, 
which will help mitigate additional unintentional effects, like the loss of culture and 
sovereignty, and climate-related diasporas that post a threat to the global community 
and economy, and to individual states. Fourth, this approach includes forms of bottom-
up, context-driven adaptation, but also compensatory justice, providing for broader 
prescriptions and forms of reparations from the damages caused by GCC. Fifth, contrary 
to the other approaches, this approach does not necessarily require international 
consensus to work or to build new institutions out of whole cloth. Sixth, the outcome 
approach breaks down the state-based formula necessary within the T&T approach and 
allows for vulnerable populations in developed countries, like impoverished sectors in 
                                                 
14 Admittedly, proving specific causation, legally or even politically, is a significant issue, but one that 
does not subvert the argument here. 
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the USA or the Inuit (in the USA, Canada, and Russia), to be recognized based on how 
they are affected by climate change. Finally, making the outcome approach, more than 
any other, has the potential to galvanize (Rayner 2010) because all parties need to adapt 
and build more resilient societal spaces. All in all, by including a fuller range of costs, 
an outcome approach changes the GCC calculus in ways that provide a more accurate 
reflection of the GCC problem and its consequences.  
 
The major disadvantage of this approach is that it raises the perceived ‘costs’15 of GCC, 
which create clear disincentives to broadening the approach to GCC. Although 
perceived costs do not include costs to the environment, vulnerable communities, 
security, or the costs of ‘doing nothing’. Second, a pure ‘justice’ angle rarely generates 
political action that counters national self-interest. A third drawback would be getting 
the global community to recognize climate impacts for those most vulnerable and to 
adequately fund adaptation. The proposed US$100 billion for adaptation in the Cancun 
Agreements does not come close to the amount deemed necessary for large-scale 
adaptation globally (Stern 2009). In addition, global financial constraints and political 
perceptions of the climate issue suggest that as more resources are devoted to mitigation 
to prevent 2 C, less will be devoted toward adaptation. This ‘pendulum of costs’ is 
beyond the scope of this article, but it does provide a potentially significant limitation to 
the outcome approach. This stresses the importance of incentivized connection with 
another approach that properly incentivizes the development of clean energy with 
climate adaptation. Finally, ‘cost’ calculi represents a Pandora’s box, as who determines 
what is a climate-related impact, to what degree is it climate-related, who gets the 
money (what hierarchy), and who collects and distributes it with the capability of 
monitoring to ensure its proper use? These questions are not fatal flaws, but they point 
to significant impediments to international agreement and future climate policy. 
 
Reframing the approach to climate governance  
Changing the climate change frame: Justifying outcome and source approaches 
In evaluating the five approaches, the key question is not so much about mitigation or 
adaptation as it is how much of climate change can (and should) be accepted. In the 
                                                 
15 I say perceived costs here, because multifarious and significant costs are associated with GCC, far 
beyond mitigation costs and/or even adaptation costs, such as the damage to culture, indirect costs to local 
or national economies, or even administrative costs (at all levels). However, to date, the singular focus of 
climate negotiation has been on national level mitigation costs. 
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language of Article 2, the question is how much climate change can be endured yet 
avoid DAI (‘dangerous anthropic interference’). Today, mitigation and adaptation are 
considered in separate spheres or more recently as ‘two sides to the same coin.’ That 
said, much of the discussion and policy remains based on the T&T approach toward 
mitigation (that is, regulating GHG emissions at the national scale). This becomes an 
economic question—how much climate mitigation can be afforded? In this short-term 
view, economic self-interest will prevail over the environmental considerations, at least 
until such environmental costs become more apparent and significant or economic 
interests align with environmental ones. This directly suggests that, even at the national 
level, it is economically rational to delay action until those costs become increasingly 
clear or until new technology develops. The success of the regime, even if fully 
implemented, is then completely dependent on the degree to which technology provides 
answers. Even with motivation toward developing clean development technologies, 
finding cooperative arrangements when varying states have different historical 
responsibilities, capacities, political ideologies, and goals is difficult. In other words, the 
T&T approach in many ways inhibits economic motivation from being fully pursued 
and realized. It politicizes the climate regime and inhibits both market incentives and 
fails to address the human security of vulnerable peoples. As a result, at the global level 
the targets and timetables strategy inspires various forms of free riding, as larger 
national economies can continue business-as-usual without any additional economic 
costs,16 while others suffer the consequences. Without long-term goals and assessments, 
this free riding remains and national economic self-interest and externalizing economic 
and environmental costs become the driving forces of the climate regime.  
 
However, when the question is changed to ask how much of climate change can (and 
should) be accepted by the global community, the calculus changes. I am not suggesting 
that nations will not continue to view climate policy through a lens of self-interest. 
Rather, climate change is a global problem that creates changes in global climate, and 
thus to solve it requires a global perspective—not a conglomeration of national 
perspectives. This global perspective is further justified by two elements, one that 
humans are directly and disproportionately affected by the actions of other humans, and 
second, that the earth’s biosphere is a global commons that all human beings are entitled 
                                                 
16 Some scholars may suggest that economic opportunity costs arelost by delay, particularly in developing 
renewable energy technologies, and has been suggested, there are many who suggest that the long-term 
consideration of climate change has present economic costs of delaying action now (Stern 2007). 
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to enjoy free of harm. On the former, the disproportionate effects create not only severe 
inequity but also serious security risks at the national and global levels.  
 
In shifting the question to a global perspective and away from national self-interest, the 
foci of the problem itself are transformed in two ways. First, it includes those adversely 
affected by climate change and therefore brings the outcome approach to the fore, and 
second, the question emphasizes some form of an approach that is best for the global 
community, and not exclusively based on state self-interest. The emphasis then is on a 
source approach, one that may focus on creating clean energy and new technology—
which can be employed to the benefit of the global community.  Simply put, this is a 
global problem affecting all nations (and people) and solutions should benefit all nations 
and the global community. This approach transforms the climate debate into a positive 
sum game. 
 
When outcomes and sources are included in climate policy discussion, the calculus for 
mitigation is also changed. That is, adaptation becomes a cost of mitigation, and more 
emphasis is put on preventing the damage caused by human augmented GHG emissions 
(to reduce the costs of adaptation). So, if mitigation is solely part of the economic 
calculus, then for self-interested individuals, the equation is simple: is the harm from 
global climate change (to themselves or community) greater than economic costs of 
mitigation? Most in the USA see little harm from GCC to themselves personally, and 
therefore any economic cost is likely too high. However, if adaptation is part of the cost 
equation—that is, harm to others caused by GHG emissions, then the costs of doing 
nothing increase and becomes part of tradeoff analysis for climate policy. Action to 
prevent future harm (and costs) becomes imperative. In this form, justice emerges 
naturally from the cost equation, not as a function of strict national mitigation and/or 
historic responsibility. In addition, it provides political justification for domestic 
policies on climate change, particularly for the USA. As such, this is the core strength of 
the outcome approach to global climate change. Even further, this can be incentivized 
through the source approach based on developing clean technologies.  
 
Assessing ‘danger’ in Article 2 
The threshold question from Article 2 for long-term climate policy centers on assessing 
(i) DAI—dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, and (ii) what 
are the subject(s) of the prevention.  In preventing DAI with the climate system, the 
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question becomes: what is the mandate designed to prevent or protect? Most scholars 
and policy makers have interpreted this aspect of DAI to mean the establishment of 
formal mechanisms designed around stabilizing national emissions by the largest 
polluters to ultimately ‘stabilize’ global GHGs to prevent a 2 C increase. Thus the 
regime has advocated and promoted for the last 20 years the T&T approach to climate 
policy. The argument here is not to dismiss informal mechanisms and/or formal 
monitoring of national GHGs, but rather, that this approach as the core of the regime 
misses the mark. Rather, the source approach, particularly when long-term goals are 
considered, offers a more substantive and effective path forward for the regime. It 
places energy at the center rather than aggregated emissions and targets and timetables. 
This offers more pragmatic pathways to generating effective GHG mitigation and 
international agreement. 
 
On the second question—what is climate policy designed to protect from DAI, closer 
examination of the secondary aspects of Article 2 provides some insight. Specifically, 
Article 2 states (in the second part) that the ceiling for global GHG emissions should be 
kept at a level ‘to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a 
sustainable manner’ (UN 1992). The focus here is on maintaining global GHG 
concentrations at a given level to allow natural ecosystem adaptation, not threaten 
agricultural production, and promote sustainable development. The question is whether 
Article 2, in establishing the purpose and goal of the regime, included consideration of 
the impacts from climate change, and if so, to what degree and in what form should we 
consider the effects from climate change as part of the core mandate of the climate 
regime? 
 
Considering the whole of Article 2, should concentrations (through radiative climate 
forcing) reach a level where changes to the ecosystem outpace adaptation and/or 
threaten food production, it would indeed constitute ‘dangerous’ interference with the 
climate system. This provides an initial clue that the framers were thinking to include 
‘impacts’ to human support systems when drafting the Article. In fact, in some parts of 
the world—for example, atolls, the Arctic, lowlands of Africa—we are already seeing 
the pace of changes outstrip natural adaptation, food production, and adaptive capacity. 
In addition, much of international environmental law (IEL) has evolved primarily based 
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on the norms that states are responsible for ‘transboundary harm’ from activities within 
their dominion and control.17 This principle of IEL that states are responsible for 
transboundary harm reinforces that states should be theoretically responsible for climate 
impacts. This, in conjunction with anthropogenic interference with the climate system 
that threatens food production implies that climate impacts must be part of the initial 
design of Article 2.  
 
Article 1 of the UNFCCC (UN 1992) also provides guidance on ‘adverse effects of 
climate change’ as it states: 
 
‘Adverse effects of climate change’ means changes in the physical environment or biota 
resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, 
resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-
economic systems or on human health and welfare. 
 
As part of the Convention, Article 1 suggests concern for socio-economic and health 
aspects of climate impacts, not just biophysical impacts (See Jamieson 1992, 1996; 
Rayner & Malone 1998; Adger 2001; Gupta et al. 2003; Gardiner 2006).  In addition, 
Article 4.1(f) asks all parties to minimize adverse climate effects on: ‘[T]he economy, 
on public health and on the quality of the environment, of projects or measures 
undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to climate change’ (UN 1992, UNFCCC Article 
4(1)(f)). 
 
However, despite this reading of Article 1, there has been less attention to the socio-
economic aspects as a source of ‘danger’ in discussions on Article 2. Rather, the 
‘political and diplomatic process through which it evolved paid much more attention to 
physical and biological vulnerabilities as sources of danger, and rather less attention to 
economic issues …[while] ethical and cultural considerations have been nearly absent’ 
(Oppenheimer & Petsonk 2005: 213). Clearly if there are socio-economic 
considerations as part of ‘danger,’ the broader aspects of human systems, i.e. cultural, 
ethical and psychological, must also be part of the calculus.  
                                                 
17 See the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21, which is echoed in the Rio Declaration, Principle 2: 
‘States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ Principle 21 has now 
become customary law, which means that it applies to all states and not only states to a particular 
agreement. In IEL, see: Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3, United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards 1911 (1938), reprinted in 33 A.J.I.L. 182 (1939), 3, United Nations Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards 1938 (1941), reprinted in 35 A.J.I.L. 684 (1941). 
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In further support of this interpretation, the final sentence of Article 2 gives significant 
primacy to ‘sustainable development.’ Although this could be an attempt to privilege 
economic development relative to climate change and environmental harm, it 
nevertheless demonstrates a linkage between climate ‘danger,’ its outcomes (effects), 
and sustainable development (Brundtland 1987).  Given the history of sustainable 
development and climate change, the nexus between sustainable development—defined 
by the WCED as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’—and climate 
change fit naturally with the ideas of stabilizing future concentrations and preventing 
dangerous outcomes—particularly for future generations (Oppenheimer & Petsonk 
2005).  This emphasizes the three Es of Environment (protection), economic 
(development) and equity (fairness in process and substance) as part of climate 
governance. Reading both the precepts of sustainable development in line with Article 1 
of the UNFCCC strongly suggests that not only would DAI include climate impacts, but 
it would also include socio-economic, cultural, and health (mental, emotional and 
psychological) impacts in addition to the biophysical ones (IPCC 2007d; Schneider et al. 
2001). To include these necessary elements therefore endorses the outcome approach to 
climate policy. 
 
Article 2: A ‘danger’ to whom? 
What remains unanswered, however, is what a ‘danger’ is to whom and how should 
those ‘in danger’ be assessed? Here, there is no easy answer. A single, absolute metric 
of ‘dangerous anthropic interference’ cannot be attained due to differential impacts and 
vulnerabilities (Dessai et al. 2003, 2004; Schneider 2001, 2004; Jacoby 2004). 
Moreover, ‘dangerous’ is a socially constructed term that requires knowledge of local 
context to understand how these impacts and vulnerabilities contextually play out. In 
determining DAI, value judgments are necessary to determine who is affected. Such 
value judgments are context specific (Dessai et al. 2004) and imply judgments about 
selection, comparability and significance, which in turn suggest that peoples’ 
perceptions play a large role in defining ‘dangerous’ (see, generally, Azar & Sterner 
1996).  In other words, ‘various societies and peoples may value the significance of 
impacts and vulnerabilities on human and natural systems differently’ (IPCC 2007d: 
784). For example, a resource-dependent society will value protecting its resource base 
more than most developed countries, and will thus prioritize the risk or ‘danger’ to those 
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resources. As a result, biophysical indicators cannot sufficiently capture that 
communities—particularly those with different socio-economic positions, will be 
affected differently by the same level of climate change, and therefore they will not 
share the same meaning of ‘dangerous.’ 
 
Finally, the choice of scale is ‘also crucial, as considerations of fairness, justice and 
equity require examination of the distribution of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation 
potential, not only among, but also within groupings’ (IPCC 2007d: 784; Jamieson 
1992; Gardiner 2004). Thus in operationalizing Article 2, examining how climate 
impacts affect people in a local context, and how people perceive those risks associated 
with climate change are critical features in determining DAI. These aspects of climate 
policy and policy discussions are understated in negotiations and understudied in 
climate scholarship.  
 
This suggests that DAI is both how people are contributing to GHGs that change the 
biophysical climate system, but also how people are affected by these changes in 
climate and how they perceive that their exposure to the danger (posed by climate 
changes) has been augmented. As a result, before there can be a logical first step toward 
defining DAI at the global level, it must be understood from a climate impact 
perspective at the local level, including people’s perception of risk. Therefore, long-
term goals for equitable global climate policy (in meeting the objective of the UNFCCC 
as outlined by Article 2) can only be attained by understanding locally derived 
conditions that assess and establish ‘risk’ and DAI. A second insight from these 
approaches to DAI is that it provides a cogent argument for establishing long-term goals 
and targets around DAI, which help guide near-term decisions on mitigation 
commitments under the Convention (Corfee-Morlot & Hohne 2003) as well as protect 
the most vulnerable by understanding their exposure to climate changes in their local 
context (Fisher 2011). 
 
Conclusion: Implications and consequences for climate governance  
I have argued that by establishing long-term goals for climate policy we can deduce 
more effective short-term climate policy (instead of the current approach of starting 
with short-term goals and moving forward). This requires understanding the tangible 
threats from climate change and recognizing synergistic linkages for incentivizing 
climate action. It necessitates reframing the political problem of global climate change 
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to define ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with the climate system in identifying 
those threats.  
 
Developing long-term goals to address these threats from global climate change 
depends in large part on defining and operationalizing elements of UNFCCC Article 2. 
In attempting to operationalize Article 2, I showed that there are several stages in the 
causal process where climate changes could be measured, monitored and addressed by 
the regime. Currently, the regime has adopted the T&T approach to address climate 
changes, which has been shown to be politically difficult in international negotiations, 
particularly considering China and the USA are reluctant to engage in national 
emissions caps. Without addressing the unsustainable drivers of GCC, this approach 
may not address effectively the climate problem even if fully implemented. It also runs 
the risk that it may exacerbate current global inequalities, which places additional 
emphasis on developing a climate architecture that includes fair distribution of the 
responsibility and burdens from climate change. However, despite the proliferation of 
literature on burden allocation, from a policy perspective, it is very difficult to negotiate 
and get self-interested actors to comply with agreed-on parameters. 
 
One of the primary risks from climate change to global (and national) economic and 
political systems is the increasing cost from growing insecurity and inequity. Both 
elements provide a challenge to the global system, a risk that is underrepresented in 
current international negotiations and climate policy calculi. Instead of climate security, 
responsibility and equity framing the climate debate, it has been mischaracterized as a 
singular environmental issue using the T&T approach. Climate change however is not a 
function of environmental degradation per se, but rather a function of unsustainable 
drivers of human development that represents significant threats to human systems, 
particularly those most vulnerable. This explains why traditional environmental 
methods and solutions have been ineffective in addressing the climate problem.   
 
Therefore, the climate regime must replace the T&T approach with a combination of 
outcome and source approaches. By adopting these approaches, it essentially splits 
mitigation and adaptation into two separate strategies. The first is based on energy 
transformation and sources of emissions, where major polluters, the USA and China, 
can build common ground. By focusing on energy transformation will deviate each 
country from the business as usual path, while bypassing what may be an intractable 
Fisher         Shifting Global Climate Governance 
 
PORTAL, vol. 8, no. 3, September 2011.  26 
problem of fair allocation and responsibility. The second is an explicit focus on 
adaptation because as currently constituted in the regime, adaptation is a secondary 
priority to mitigation. 
 
The source approach shifts the focus away from national GHG emissions’ limits to the 
development of clean energy toward long-term goals of carbon neutrality and 
(relatively) equal per capita emissions. In operationalizing this aspect of Article 2, it 
establishes targets based on the development of clean energy and renewable energy 
implementation (and targets), which can be more effectively integrated into an 
incentivized climate regime as well as address directly the drivers of GHG emissions. 
This approach also offers synergies and incentives for the USA and China to cooperate. 
Both countries recognize that ‘green growth’ is a key to the future of economic 
development, and both recognize not only the harmful effects to ecosystems and 
humans from industrial processes, but also that energy systems must be transformed. In 
addition, energy targets could be integrated into a system of contraction and 
convergence that allows for higher emissions, at least temporarily, the more funding and 
research put into energy development. This would create more equitable framework, 
based on contracting emissions per capita, while emphasizing energy transformation. 
The source approach therefore is a bridge between the seemingly growing gap between 
China and the USA, as well as bridges the divide between developed and developing 
countries. It provides a path forward where none exists currently based on the T&T 
approach. 
 
This shift would also recognize, through the outcome approach, the need to protect 
those most immediately threatened by the effects of climate change. It was established 
that this includes climate impacts more generally, and includes not only biophysical 
effects but also socio-economic, cultural and psychological effects. Next, this process 
should be examined at the local level and by studying how people are affected by a 
combination of causal and consequential pathways. These macro-approaches to climate 
change would be more effective in both addressing the drivers of GHG emissions 
(rather than based purely on outcomes) and provides clearer incentives to climate action. 
They also work together to create a more equitable approach (a mandate from both 
UNFCCC regime and sustainable development), both normatively in establishing long-
term non-binding goals as well as empirically through active protection of the most 
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vulnerable as a function of security—not merely as a handout or opaque notions of 
justice.18 In the final analysis, creating long-term goals with guideposts built around the 
source and outcome approaches is critical not only to creating an efficacious and 
equitable climate architecture but to the policy and governance of the issue.  
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